The cyclical variation in office construction, vacancies, rents and values over the last decade has been enormous throughout the world. Special factors magnified the variation in numerous countries --the U.S. savings and loan debacle and the Finish reaction to the collapse of the USSR to name two, but the variation has been large in almost all countries (Goetzmann and Wachter, 1995, and Renaud, 1994) Some have attributed the severity of property cycles to developers building too late in the boom and well into the bust, attributing the error to either prolifigate lenders or egomaniacal developers. Recent work by Grenadier questions this error hypothesis. Given the value of the option to wait before developing and the high costs of adjusting to shifts in space demand, he argues that overbuilding in markets for assets with long gestation periods is consistent with optimal development strategies (Grenadier, 1995 and .
of property markets. Given the incentives of developers to build when value rises substantially above replacement cost and not to build when value is low relative to replacement cost, the property market has to be mean reverting. That is, when times are really good (low vacancy rates and high real rents), they can t continue, and the same is true when markets are really bad. If investors don t incorporate this implied mean reversion into their forecasts of future cash flows, and our examination of the Sydney market in the decade from 1985 suggests they do not, they will over value properties when values are already high and under value properties when they are low, exaggerating the cyclical swings in office values and thus in office construction and vacancies. Of course, valuations obtained by simply capping current cash flows are unlikely to incorporate full mean reversion. This paper begins by describing a method for checking real estate value estimates in overbuilt markets. The method is based on an analogy to the valuation of discount bonds: just as the market value of a discount bond can be expressed as par value less the present value of expected below-market coupon interest income, fundamental value can be expressed as replacement cost less the present value of expected below-equilibrium real rental income.
Underpinnings for calculation of the adjustment of below-equilibrium real rents to their equilibrium are given in section two. Investor expectations of future vacancy rates are developed (with JLW Consulting s assistance for the 1989-92 period), and estimates are reported of a meanreverting real rental adjustment equation from which future real rents can be forecast.
Expectations of future vacancy rates and real rents provide a future rental income stream to compare with equilibrium rental income (based on expected real discount rates).
In section three, ratios are developed of values derived from series commonly reported in two prominent Australian real estate sources, JLW and BOMA, to estimates of fundamental value.
1 During the 1986-89 period, the ratio of JLW and BOMA value series to the estimate of certainly distorts the apparent timing of the cycle.
The Basic Valuation Model
The fundamental value of a property in period t (V t ) is the present value of expected future net operating income. Assuming, for simplicity, that the expected ratio of operating expenses to replacement cost (oper) and one-period real risky financing rates (r) are constant through time, value at time t for a tax-exempt investor is where g is the expected gross rental rate per real replacement-cost dollar of occupied space, v is the expected vacancy rate, and RC, the current real replacement cost of built space, is expected to decline at the depreciation rate, d.
4 Some have argued that appraisers are reluctant to revalue properties sharply over short periods. This tendency could be exaggerated for downward adjustments owing to incentives of investment managers to maintain the values upon which their percentage fees are based.
5 Hendershott and Kane (1995) contend that the Russell NCREIF U.S. Office market index overstated fundamental value by a third throughout the 1986-90 period, finally correcting in the early 1990s. Geltner and Mei (1995) argue that the more broadly based Russell/NCREIF U.S. total commercial-property index, appropriately adjusted, declined by 37 percent between 1985 and 1991, more than double the 16 percent measured decline. Assuming the index was accurate in 1985, it overstated value by a third in 1991 (the 1991 ratio of index value to true value is (1-0.16)/(1-0.37), assuming the values were equal in 1985). When replacement cost exceeds value, replacement construction is deferred, lowering vacancies and raising rents and value. Moreover, expectations of the construction, vacancy and rent responses suggest that existing real estate values will be only modestly sensitive to changes in required real returns (Hendershott, 1996) .
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The second equilibrium property is that gross rental rates will continually equal real financing costs plus economic depreciation and operating expenses. More specifically, Third, current and future expected vacancy rates will equal the natural vacancy rate, v*. The consistency of equation (1) with these three properties can be verified by setting all v t+j = v*, all g t+j = g, and substituting (2) into (1). The real risky rate and the depreciation rate are set at 0.095 (0.06 risk-free rate plus a 0.035 percent risk premium) and 0.025, respectively, throughout the 1985-95 period, and, based on BOMA data, the ratio of operating expense ratio is set equal to 0.05 (Hendershott, 1995) . This gives a 17 percent gross rental rate.
6 Value must exceed replacement cost by enough to outweigh the value of the option to wait before developing (Dixit, 1992; Grenadier, 1995 and .
With some algebraic manipulation (see Hendershott, 1996) , it can be shown that the V/RC ratio is reduced from unity to the extent that expected future below-equilibrium rents (BERI) exist:
where The key to valuation in overbuilt markets is clear from equations (3) and (4). Value is below replacement cost because high vacancy rates and low gross rental rates have lowered rental income below equilibrium income. How much value is below replacement cost depends largely on how soon rental income is expected to return to its equilibrium value. The quicker the return, the smaller is the discount from replacement cost.
Vacancy Expectations and Rental Adjustment
The expected future time paths of Sydney vacancy rates are presented in Table 1, which lists market participant's assumed future vacancy rates as of year-end over the 1985-95 period.
Each column (except for the last) contains the rate expected during June of the year heading the column to exist at the end of the years in the far left column. Because investors are assumed to be able to accurately forecast the year-end rate, the diagonal contains observed vacancy rates. For the June 1985 though June 1988 period, the next year vacancy rates are also assumed to be accurately forecast. Because these rates are below the natural rate, they are increased a percentage point a year to 8 percent and then reduced over two years to the natural rate. The vacancy rate data suggest a potential systematic problem. Late in the boom , vacancy rate forecasts are far too optimistic (almost by definition). Good times will never end (the business cycle is dead). Briefly, early in the bust (1991), future reality and expectations of it match. Then undue pessimism sets in (1992-93), with vacancy expectations being far greater than warrented by future events. A cycle of overly optimistic and then pessimistic investor vacancy rate expectations will exaggerate normal cyclical swings in investment value.
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The last input to the valuation is a forecast of the real effective rental rate. The forecast is based on an estimated equation (Hendershott, 1995) where the rental rate is linked to gaps between both the natural and actual vacancy rates (v* and v -1 ) and equilibrium and actual gross rental rates (g* and g -1 ) as well as the forward change in the vacancy rate:
With all variables measured in percentages, the three estimated coefficients were 1.71, 2.26, and 0.85, respectively.
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Note the appealing properties of this specification. An episode of overbuilding causes vacancy rates to surge and real rents to decline. The resultant value decline stops new development, and the lower rents increase absorption, eventually causing a reversal of vacancy rates. However, long before the vacancy rate falls back to the natural rate, the developing gap between equilibrium and actual rents will cause real rents to begin to recover.
Moreover, with v = v*, the real rental rate will eventually return to its equilibrium value.
Measurement of real effective rents requires the downward adjustment of real face rents for both free rent periods and tenant improvements. Conveniently for us, JLW (1992) collected data on both of these terms for Sydney office markets over the 1970-91 period. According to their data, rent incentives increased sharply over the 1989-91 period, rising from less than four 9 It would be interesting to compare investor expectations and actual vacancy data for other cities and cycles. Unfortunately, investor expectations data are not readily available.
10 Because the natural vacancy rate is treated as a constant over time, v t+j-1 is included as a regressor and the constant term is v*. Thus the natural rate can be computed after the estimation as the ratio of the constant term to the coefficient on the lagged vacancy rate ( ). With an estimated constant of 11.63, v* is 6.8 percent.
Install Equation Editor and doubleclick here to view equation. months equivalent free months rent (including adjustment for improvements) on a ten-year lease to 60 free months, by September 1992 (JLW has not defined precisely how they computed equivalent months free rent). JLW also computes effective real rents by discounting/amortizing real cash flows with a real interest rate. We have adjusted JLW's methodology in only one respect; they amortize the present value of the rent incentives over the life of the building whereas we amortize over the length of the lease. With this adjustment, the amortized value of the rent incentives jumped from 6 percent of real face rent in 1989 to 42 percent in 1992.
11 Figure 1 plots the equilibrium real effective rental rate, the actual real effective rental rate, and the dynamically predicted rate based on the estimated equation (the initial rate moved forward based on the predicted changes). Because the annual errors in predicted changes are largely independent, the predicted rate tracks the actual reasonably well. Table 1 . The equation predicts another 27 percent decline in the real effective rental rate before an upturn in 1998.
In fact, effective real rents apparently fell sharply in 1993 and have since recovered somewhat. Because we have been unable to obtain the raw Sydney rental data from JLW, we cannot recompute effective rents amortizing incentives over the life of the lease. However, during the 1989-92 period a rough rule of thumb for adjusting face rents tracks the actual percentage change in effective rents quite closely. This rule says that effective rents can be calculated as the product of face rents and (1 -months equivalent free rent/100). The actual and rule-of-thumb percentage changes are listed in Table 2 . Because of the close 1989-92 relation, we have used the rule for the 1993-95 period, computing percentage changes (midyear to midyear) of -43, 9, and 30. The abrupt turnaround in 1994 and 1995, as opposed to the predicted minor further decline, reflects the sharp decline in vacancy rates that actually occurred relative to that forecasted in 1992 (12 percentage points versus two points).
Fundamental, BOMA, and JLW Values, 1985-95
Using our framework and appropriate assumptions, a time series of the value/replacementcost ratio for Sydney office buildings is constructed for the 1985-95 period. In addition, comparable "market" data are computed from the BOMA and JLW data. Comparison of these data with those estimated using our method reveals substantial differences.
Column 1 of Table 3 Value is not high in 1989, in spite of a low vacancy rate and high rental rate, because vacancy rates are expected to rise and real rents to fall, the latter owing to both the rising vacancy rate and the then above equilibrium rental rate. That is, mean reversion in rental cash flows is expected.
Subsequent sharper than expected jumps in the vacancy rate and plunging real effective rents lower the ratio to 0.435 in 1992. 12 The subsequent decline in the observed vacancy rate and thus continually more optimistic forecast of lower vacancy rates, and the related higher forecasts of real rents, raises the ratio to 0.89 by 1995.
A comparable BOMA/Russell series comes from a two-step procedure. First, the appreciation component of the BOMA/Russell office return series is cumulated to generate a nominal appraised value series. Second, to obtain a real constant-quality measure, this series is divided by the deflator for private consumption (scaled to unity in June 1985) and then blown up by 1.25 percent per year to allow for depreciation in the replacement-cost denominator. (The 1.25 percent is less than the general 2.5 percent depreciation rate because new buildings are continuously added to the BOMA data base.) The BOMA/Russell series is set equal to 1.11, the fundamental-value/RC ratio, in June 1985. A comparable JLW series is obtained by adjusting the JLW nominal capital value indicator for inflation and depreciation, but now using a 2.5 percent depreciation factor because JLW does not add new buildings to its index. Again, the 1985 value is assumed to be 1.11.
The BOMA and JLW series rise from 1.11 in 1985 to 1.0 in 1989 before declining.
Because these ratios and the fundamental value ratio are all computed relative to an arbitrary measure of replacement cost, we divide the BOMA and JLW ratios by the fundamental value ratio and list the results in columns 2 and 3. By this division, the suspect replacement cost denominators are canceled. In computing these ratios of ratios, estimates of the value of above market leases are added to fundamental value. 13 As can be seen, the ratios of the BOMA and JLW values to fundamental value roughly double between June 1986 and June 1990. The land value estimates of the NSW s Valuer General referred to earlier confirm that market value did, 13 The assumed values (as a fraction of RC) are, from 1990 on, 0.04, 0.08, 0.12, 0.15, 0.13, and 0.08. indeed, far exceed fundamental value then.
The obvious question is why did market value leap so high relative to our estimate of fundamental value in the second half of the 1980s? Two possibilities are that the real required return on real estate (the risk premium in our model) may have declined (our estimate of fundamental value may be too low) or investors may not have been incorporating mean reversion in their forecast of rents (a speculative bubble may have developed). When we redo the 1989 fundamental value computation assuming that investors extrapolate the low vacancies and high rents of 1989 forever into the future, we get a V/RC ratio of 1.5. When we combine this extrapolation with a 3.5 percentage point lower required return (zero risk premium and thus a 13.5 percent equilibrium gross rental rate), the V/RC ratio rises to 1.9, which makes the ratios of both the BOMA and the JLW series to fundamental value equal to unity. That is, to explain the rise in the BOMA and JLW value series, we need to assume both a decline in the required risk premium to zero and the continuation of the extraordinarily high 1989 cash flows forever. Owing to the sharper than expected turnaround in the Australian economy, the vacancy rate was around 11 percent by the end of 1995, a full 10 percentage points below that anticipated in 1992 to exist in 1995. As Table 3 indicates, the V/RC ratio is back to 0.89 and the BOMA and JLW series are in line with fundamental value. In fact, the BOMA series, which was constant between 1993 and 1995, may now be lagging the recovery in market values.
Summary
While real effective Sydney office market rents rose by 50 percent between 1985 and 1989, the vacancy situation deteriorated markedly. In 1985 vacancy rates were expected to average 2.6 percent during the next five years; in 1989, the same expectation was 8 percent.
Moreover, real effective rents had moved from 10 percent below equilibrium to 30 percent above.
As a result, real fundamental value estimates based on expected future real net cash flows were marginally lower in 1989 than in 1985.
In contrast, value estimates developed from the capital return component of the BOMA return series and from the JLW capital value series nearly doubled during these years. In effect, investors appear to have simply capped the extraordinarily high --nonsustainable given vacancy and thus net rent expectations --late 1980s cash flows at an abnormally low cap rate. Investors did not build mean reversion into their cash flow forecasts. As a result, they widely overestimate value at the cycle peak and undervalue it at the trough.
This blind extrapolative investor behavior can also explain Grenadier s puzzle (1996, note 17) , where he finds that differential concurrent and future demand growth cannot explain the differences between the extraordinarily large office market completions in Denver and Houston and the modest completions in Chicago and Minneapolis during the 1982-85 period. In fact, differences in earlier demand growth Consider a ten year office lease with a monthly face rent of 100, tenant improvements of 500 (current present value), and 24 months of free rent. (Assume that this rent is expected to be constant over the life of the lease.) Equivalent months of free rent equals 24 plus the months added by the 500 TI. Because these months have to be added on to the 24, we would solve the following equation for x to obtain the equivalent months free rent.
where d is the monthly discount rate. Note that x is a greater number than would be obtained by solving for x* and adding it to 24. We ignore here the question of the correct discount rate, noting only that if the face rent is assumed to be constant in real terms, then a real discount rate should be used.
The effective rent on a ten-year lease (ER) would then be obtained by solving Some have argued that one should calculate effective rent over a multiple lease period (e.g., JLW, 1992), say 30 years (three ten-year leases). In that case, one has to make assumptions regarding what the incentives will be at each future releasing period, as well as what the face rent will be. Say, for simplicity, that the (real) face rent is expected to be constant for the entire 30 years and that on each of the future release dates TI of 500 and a free rent period of 4 months will be given. Then the equivalent months free rent is obtained by first computed the present value of these additional incentives and then solving or x, where n was the equivalent free months rent coming from the first lease up (from solving an analogue to equation A1). 
